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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3707
12 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
Director, National Security Agency

Lt. General James A. Williams, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Mr. Hugh Montgomery
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State


Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: DCI Terrorism Analyst Net

May I have your coordination or comments on the attached, if possible, by 1300 hours on 13 January.


Eloise R. Page
Chairman

Attachment:

1. Concept of Operation
2. Technical Feasibility of DCI Terrorism Analyst Net

FILE COPY: Perm Temp
☐ CMX Cmtt file
☒ CMX Sert file IMUS-Terrorism
☐ CMX Office file
☐ CMX Chrono XRF

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3708

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: DCI Terrorism Analyst Net
FROM: Eloise R. Page
Chairman

1. Attachment 1 is our concept of operations for a terrorism analyst network connecting the Community's various terrorism intelligence elements. We have already discussed the technical feasibility of the matter with several of the major components and our tentative conclusions are contained at Attachment 2.

2. This memo has been coordinated by:

Lt. General Lincoln D. Faurer
Lt. General James A. Williams
Mr. Hugh Montgomery

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3. Therefore, in order to effect implementation of the Terrorism Analyst Net, it is recommended that you approve this concept of operation.

Eloise R. Page
Chairman

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

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DCI TERRORISM ANALYST NETWORK

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

MISSION: To provide a mechanism for terrorism analysts within the Intelligence Community to exchange rapidly critical information related to terrorism with the objective of assessing and making judgments concerning that information. Desired outputs from this network are:

- All-source terrorism intelligence assessments to be transmitted to affected organizations and other interested customers by the most expeditious means available.
- As applicable, collection tasking recommendations to be provided to the appropriate collection manager(s) (HUMINT, SIGINT, Imagery).

This network would also provide a focal point for customer queries on the subject of terrorism and an ability, through designated analyst representatives, to have access to relevant information contained in existing terrorism data bases.

OPERATION: Conversational. Informal, non-record. Not to be used in lieu of NOIWON for highly time-sensitive situations nor to preempt restricted dissemination.

MODES: Order of preference (1) voice over keyboard, (2) voice only, (3) keyboard only.

SECURITY: TS/SI/TK. No electronic connections to incoming message systems anticipated at outset.

TERM OF OPERATION: Until DESIST or other suitable solution comes on line.

MEMBERSHIP: DIA, CIA, NSA, State, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, FBI, JSOC, Secret Service.

LOCATIONS: DIA: NMIC and OS-1 spaces
CIA: Ops Center, DDO space, DDI space
State: Ops Center plus two other spaces
Plus at least one terminal for each of the remaining members

MANAGEMENT: NSA would serve as technical manager of network communications. Substantive management of the network will be the responsibility of the NIO for Terrorism with CIA acting as his Executive Agent for this purpose.

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STAFFING: Each agency is encouraged to provide a terrorist specialist to man a 24-hour watch. In the event that such analytical expertise is not available it may be necessary to use regular watch officers with duty specialists on call.

DISSEMINATION: A communications link to specific threat sites could prove useful under certain circumstances. Provisions to incorporate such a link should not be ruled out, but are not a specific requirement at this time.

NOTE: A significant advantage of the concept proposed above can be put in place quickly with minimal cost. It would not replace existing reporting mechanisms and procedures but rather would supplement them. The experience gained from operations of the network for a reasonable period of time (say, six months) would form the basis for an informed consideration as to whether a single, fully-manned center devoted solely to terrorism is required.

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